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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision, Stevenson v. 
Utah State Tax Commission, 2005 UT App 179, 112 P.3d 1232, on 
April 14, 2005. (Attached as Addendum A.) This Court has 
jurisdiction to review the appellate ruling by certiorari 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a), (e), and (5) (West 
2004). By its Order of August 29, 2005, this Court granted the 
Commission's Petition for Writ of Certiorari upon the issues 
listed below. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Court of Appeals correctly construe Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-302(7) as to "reckless disregard of obvious known or 
risks?" 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah Supreme 
Court reviews the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals for 
correctness. Utah v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 525, 63 P.3d 650, 660, 
(quoting Longlev v, Leucadia Fin. Corp., 2000 UT 69, 513, 9 P.3d 
762, 765.) 
2. Did the Court of Appeals correctly construe Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-302(7) as to a "voluntary, conscious, and intentional 
decision to prefer other creditors over the state government?" 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah Supreme 
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Court reviews the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals for 
correctness. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 525, 63 P.3d at 660, (quoting 
Lonqlev, 2000 UT 69, 513, 9 P.3d at 765.) 
3. Did the Court of Appeals employ the correct standard of 
review? 
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction, the Utah Supreme 
Court reviews the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals for 
correctness. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 525, 63 P.3d at 660, (quoting 
Lonqlev, 2000 UT 69, 113, 9 P.3d at 765.) In addition, "[t]he 
correctness of the court of appeals' decision depends initially 
upon whether it applied the appropriate standard of review to the 
[Commission's] decision." Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 
P.2d 346, 350 (Utah 1997). Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 
(2000), the court of appeals should apply the substantial 
evidence standard in reviewing decisions of the Commission. The 
court gives deference to the Commission's findings of fact. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
The following controlling provisions are set forth in 
Addendum B: Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302 (2000); Utah Code Ann. § 
59-1-610(1)(a),(b) (West 2004); Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-406(6) 
(West 2004); 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the Court exercising its discretionary 
review powers over three possible areas of error in a decision of 
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the Court of Appeals. On May 13, 2002, the Taxpayer Services 
Division of the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission'' or 
"Commission") notified Eric Stevenson ("Stevenson") of a 
preliminary assessment of a personal non-payment penalty. (R. at 
217.) A Statutory Notice of the assessment in the amount of 
$12,018.04 was sent on July 12, 2002. (R. at 217-18.) On August 
9, 2002, Stevenson filed a Petition for Redetermination, 
requesting a hearing on this matter. (R. at 215-16.) On August 
5, 2003, a formal hearing took place before the Commission 
regarding Stevenson's Petition. (R. at 3-9.) The Commission 
issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final 
Decision on August 18, 2003, which affirmed the Taxpayer Services 
Division's personal penalty assessment against Stevenson. (R. at 
3-9.) Stevenson filed an appeal of this Final Decision on 
September 16, 2003. (R. at 2.) 
A formal hearing was held on August 5, 2003 before the 
Commission. (R. at 3-9.) Stevenson contended that his failure 
to remit the withholding tax was not willful. (R. at 231-32) On 
August 18, 2003, the Commission issued its final decision 
upholding the assessment against Stevenson (attached as Addendum 
C), finding him to be a responsible party who willfully failed to 
pay Tower's withholding tax. Stevenson, 2005 UT App 179, SI16, 
112 P.3d at 1236. (Addendum C; R. at 3-9.) 
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Judicial Review of the Agency Decision 
Stevenson appealed the Final Decision of the Commission to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. On April 14, 2005, the Utah Court of 
Appeals issued its opinion in which it reversed the Final 
Decision of the Commission and remanded the matter for 
proceedings consistent with that Opinion. Disagreeing with the 
Court of Appeals' decision, the Commission filed a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari on June 14, 2005. This Court granted the Writ 
on August 29, 2005. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Introduction: Tax Withholding 
A corporation with employees must file quarterly withholding 
tax returns and pay the amount of calculated tax liability to the 
Utah State Tax Commission ("Commission"). See Utah Code Ann. § 
59-10-406 (2000). Funds for this purpose are withheld by the 
corporation from the employees' paychecks. These are trust 
funds, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-406 (6) (West 2004). 
If a corporation fails to file the returns and pay the 
withholding tax liabilities and the corporation then becomes 
insolvent or unable to pay the tax, the Commission may assess 
personally any responsible parties in the corporation (e.g., 
officers, managers, or directors) for the amount of the 
withholding taxes left unpaid. This is known as a "personal 
penalty assessment." 
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-302 (2000) provides a test for 
determining who can be assessed a personal penalty. An 
individual must be a person with sufficient responsibility for 
collecting and paying the tax for the corporation: 
(2) Any person required to collect, truthfully account 
for, and pay over any tax listed in Subsection (1) who 
willfully fails to collect the tax, fails to truthfully 
account for and pay over the tax, or attempts in any 
manner to evade or defeat any tax or the payment of the 
tax, shall be liable for a penalty equal to the total 
amount of the tax evaded, not collected, not accounted 
for, or not paid over. This penalty is in addition to 
other penalties provided by law. 
(7)(a) In any hearing before the commission and in any 
judicial review of the hearing, the commission and the 
court shall consider any inference and evidence that a 
person has willfully failed to collect, truthfully 
account for, or pay over any tax listed in Subsection 
(1) • 
(b) It is prima facie evidence that a person has 
willfully failed to collect, truthfully account for, or 
pay over any of the taxes listed in Subsection (1) if 
the commission or a court finds that the person charged 
with the responsibility of collecting, accounting for, 
or paying over the taxes: 
(i) made a voluntary, conscious, and intentional 
decision to prefer other creditors over the state 
government or utilize the tax money for personal 
purposes; 
(ii) recklessly disregarded obvious or known 
risks, which resulted in the failure to collect, 
account for, or pay over the tax; or (iii) failed 
to investigate or to correct mismanagement, having 
notice that the tax was not or is not being 
collected, accounted for, or paid over as provided 
by law. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-302(2), (7)(a) and (b)(2000). 
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The Corporation 
Tower Communications, Inc. ("Tower") was a Utah corporation 
organized in 1999 that was later dissolved on December .31, 2000. 
(R. at 226.) The corporation contracted to install cable and 
hardware for various communications businesses. Its stock was 
owned equally by three individuals: Brett N. Cherry, Ken 
Steckelberg, and Eric Stevenson. (R. at 3.) Steckelberg was 
president and was in day-to-day control. (R. at 4, 226, 228, 
231, 237.) 
Stevenson was Tower's Secretary/Treasurer. (R. at 227, 
237.) He contemporaneously held another full-time job as a 
mortgage loan officer at Bank of Utah and was not involved in the 
day-to-day operations of Tower; however, Stevenson had the sole 
authority to sign checks for Tower. (R. at 227, 231, 238, 265.) 
Stevenson's responsibility at Tower was to manage and watch the 
money. (R. at 238.) 
As Secretary/Treasurer, Stevenson signed withholding tax 
returns for the second and fourth quarters of 1999. (R. at 55-
56.) Stevenson also signed the checks that paid the withholding 
taxes for 1999 and the first quarter of 2000. (R. at 55-56, 265-
66.) In addition, Stevenson signed Tower's franchise and income 
tax returns for 2000 and 2001. (R. at 59, 80.) 
Tower's Financial Difficulties 
In late November 2000, Stevenson made an unannounced visit 
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to Tower's place of business to review the financial records. 
(R. at 228, 245-48.) During this review, he learned that Tower 
was delinquent in paying its withholding tax for the second, 
third, and fourth quarters of 2000. (R. at 228, 248.) Upon 
learning of the true financial status of Tower, Stevenson 
immediately closed the doors of the company, fired the president, 
Steckelberg, for mismanagement, demanded that Tower dissolve, and 
began the winding-up process. (R. at 228, 248-49.) 
Payment from XO Communications 
As part of the winding-up process, Stevenson determined that 
one of Tower's clients, XO Communications, owed Tower a 
substantial sum of money. (R. at 13-37, 247-52.) However, XO 
Communications could not pay Tower the money it owed because of 
other claims held by various suppliers and contractors. (R. at 
13-37, 247-52.) In an effort to receive payment from XO 
Communications, Stevenson used personal funds to purchase these 
claims from the subcontractors and suppliers that were owed money 
by Tower for work completed on behalf of XO Communications. (R. 
at 230, 253-58.) Stevenson had these personal funds deposited in 
his attorney's trust account and directed that payments and 
releases be obtained from these suppliers and subcontractors. 
(R. at 18-37.) Upon the purchase of these subcontractor claims, 
XO Communications prepared a check for the amount it owed Tower, 
$83,211.41. (R. at 38, 230.) 
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Payment of Tower's Secured Debt Guaranteed by Stevenson 
The Bank of Utah, Stevenson's employer, had a secured claim 
against Tower, with Stevenson as a personal guarantor on the 
claim. (R. at 230, 251.) In negotiating the payment to Tower by 
XO Communications, which payment would have satisfied in full the 
withholding taxes due from Tower, Stevenson orchestrated an 
agreement between Tower and XO Communications on November 15, 
2001, that specified how XO Communication's payment was to be 
made. (R. at 39-42; see Addendum D.) Stevenson signed this 
agreement on behalf of Tower. (R. at 41-42.) Stevenson then 
directed that the XO Communications' check go directly to the 
Bank of Utah instead of to Tower or to any of Tower's other 
creditors. (R. at 39-42, 259-60.) The payment from XO 
Communications was used to satisfy the Bank of Utah's secured 
claim of December 7, 2001. (R. at 38, 260.) 
The Commission Renders A Personal Penalty Assessment 
Tower became insolvent and failed to pay many of its 
creditors. At the time of Tower's dissolution at the end of 
2000, it had failed to pay withholding tax for the second, third, 
and fourth quarters of 2000. (R. at 3, 26, 248.) The amount 
owed in withholding tax returns for these periods, which were 
eventually filed, was $12,018.04. This amount was never paid to 
the Commission. (R. at 38-42, 43-47, 233.) In May 2002, the 
Commission notified Stevenson of a preliminary assessment of a 
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personal non-payment penalty for his failure to pay Tower's 
withholding tax, (R. at 43.), at which time the procedural 
history of this case commenced. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS INCORRECTLY USED FEDERAL CASE LAW 
INSTEAD OF APPLYING THE DISTINCT STATUTORY DEFINITION OF 
"RECKLESS DISREGARD OF OBVIOUS OR KNOWN RISKS" PROVIDED BY 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-302(7). 
A. The Threshold of "Willfulness" Is Defined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-302(2), Which Differs From the Federal 
Standard Under 26 U.S.C. § 6672. 
This Court should reverse the decision of the Court of 
Appeals to correct the mistake made by that court when it failed 
to differentiate 26 U.S.C. § 6672 from Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302 
(7)(b).1 The Utah Legislature defined willful conduct in the 
context of the personal penalty assessment by enacting the 
following provision: 
Any person-required to collect, truthfully account for, and 
pay ov er any tax listed in Subsection (1) who willfully 
fails to collect the tax, fails to truthfully account for 
and pay over the tax, or attempts in any manner to evade or 
defeat any tax or the payment of the tax, shall be liable 
for a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, 
not collected, not accounted for, or not paid over. This 
penalty is in addition to other penalties provided by law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(2) (2000) (emphasis added). A direct 
comparison of this state statute and the comparable federal 
1
 The Utah Legislature amended § 59-1-302 in 2003 and 2004. 
The amendments were not substantive, because they only changed 
numbering and format. Therefore, the applicable language to the 
facts and time frame in this case will be the law as of 2000. 
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statute, 26 U.S.C. § 6672, us given in Addendum E. 
This section sets forth the conduct which subjects an 
individual to the personal penalty assessment. The Legislature 
set forth the factual tests for determining whether a person's 
conduct is "willful" in subsection 7. A personal penalty is 
assessed if "a person has willfully failed to collect, truthfully 
account for, or pay over any of the taxes" owed the state, Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-302 (7) (b) (2000) (emphasis added). Under this 
subsection, actions that constitute "reckless disregard of 
obvious or known risks" may constitute willfulness sufficient to 
subject the party to the personal penalty assessment. The 
analysis will begin with a summary of the court's decision 
followed by an argument of the court's error. 
In Stevenson/ the Court of Appeals observed that while "n[o] 
Utah case law has yet defined "willfulness' for tax purposes, . . 
. federal cases interpreting 26 U.S.C. § 6672 apply a similar 
standard, and provide some insight." 2005 UT App 179, 515, 112 
P.3d at 1235. The Court of Appeals used federal case law to 
conclude that the Commission erred in determining that 
Stevenson's actions had been "reckless" in violation of Utah law. 
Id. at 117, 112 P.3d at 1236. 
Using the decisions of two federal courts as guidance, the 
court determined that Stevenson's actions were "negligent" and 
not "willful." Id. The court reached this conclusion by 
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determining that since Stevenson did not have day-to-day control 
over Tower, he was entitled to "actual notice'7 of Tower's tax 
deficiency. The court said such notice may take the form of a 
history of failing to pay taxes. Id., (citing Hammon v. United 
States, 21 CI. Ct. 14 (1990)). Without actual notice, the court 
said that the mere failure to pay "withholding taxes for three 
quarters [was] not sufficient to present an obvious risk of 
nonpayment." Id., (citing In re Macoqnone, 253 B.R. 99, 102 
(M.D. Fla. 2000)). 
The court determined that since Stevenson was unaware of any 
history of Tower failing to pay its taxes, Stevenson did not 
receive notice of Tower's tax deficiency. Therefore, the mere 
failure to pay its taxes did not constitute a risk of nonpayment, 
notwithstanding the fact that Stevenson alone wrote all checks on 
behalf of Tower. Id. Stevenson's actions were "merely 
negligent," not "willful;" so, the court concluded,"the 
Commission had not provided prima facie that Stevenson reckless 
disregarded known or obvious risks of nonpayment." Id. 
The court erred by disregarding the threshold willfulness 
definition expressly set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(2). 
It concluded that Stevenson had not "recklessly disregarded known 
or obvious risks." It relied on federal cases that ignore the 
explicit language of the Utah statute. Under Utah law, 
Tilt is prima facie evidence that a person has willfully 
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failed to collect, truthfully account for, or pay over any 
of the taxes . . . if the commission . . . finds that the 
person charged with the responsibility of collecting, 
accounting for, or paying over the taxes: 
(ii) recklessly disregarded obvious or known risks, 
which resulted in the failure to collect, account for, 
or pay over the tax. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302 (7) (b) (ii) (2000) (emphasis added). 
In contrast to the Utah statute, 26 U.S.C. § 6672 is silent 
on the same question of what constitutes willfulness. What 
constitutes willfulness under federal law has only been defined 
through the courts; the federal courts have not stated if these 
criteria constitute a prima facie case, as does the Utah statute. 
See Stevenson, 2005 UT App 179 n.l, 112 P.3d at 1235 n.l (citing 
Cook v. United States, 52 Fed. CI. 62, 69 (2002)). The 
Legislature clearly defined conduct to impose a personal penalty 
assessment. It also refused to adopt the federal defenses used 
by the Court of Appeals. See Stevenson, 2005 UT App 179, 117, 
112 P.3d at 1236 (concluding that Stevenson's "negligent" actions 
did not subject him to the personal penalty assessment). 
When the Court of Appeals adopted the analysis of federal 
courts in interpreting the Utah personal penalty assessment, the 
court incorporated the defense of negligence and ignored plain 
Utah statutory language which are not part of the federal 
statute. This Court should reverse the decision of the court 
below because the Stevenson decision conflicts with the statutory 
12 
definition of willfulness. 
B. The Court of Appeals' Reliance on Federal 
Interpretations of "Willfulness" Is Erroneous Because 
of a Lack of Uniformity on What Constitutes Willfulness 
Under the Federal Personal Penalty Assessment in 26 
U.S.C. § 6672. 
In the alternative, if this Court rejects the Utah statutory 
definition of willfulness for reversing the Court of Appeals, 
this Court should still reverse the Court of Appeals because 
Stevenson has not acted in a manner sufficient to qualify for 
relief under the federal defense of "reasonable cause." 
In its conclusion, the Court of Appeals agreed with 
Stevenson's assertion that even if the Commission determined that 
his actions had been willful, the statute and case law are silent 
on what actually constitutes "prima facie evidence." Stevenson, 
2005 UT App 179, 124, 112 P.3d at 1238. Because of this silence, 
the court agreed to adopt a "reasonable cause" defense 
articulated by the Tenth Circuit. Id. at 125, 112 P.3d at 1238 
(quoting Finlev v. United States, 123 F.3d 1342, 1348 (10th Cir. 
1997). Using the Tenth Circuit standard which the court adopted, 
a "reasonable cause" defense against the personal penalty 
assessment exists only if "Ml) the taxpayer has made reasonable 
efforts to protect the [withholding tax] trust funds, but (2) 
those efforts have been frustrated by circumstances outside the 
taxpayer's control.'" Id. (quoting Finlev, 123 F.3d at 1348.) 
Since the Commission did not "specifically consider" reasonable 
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cause in Stevenson's actions, the court concluded that such a 
defense could exist. Id. 
This conclusion was incorrect. Not only does the court 
ignore the fact that the specific Utah statute is silent on this 
matter, but it also ignores the fact that there is no uniformity 
among federal courts as to the existence of the reasonable cause 
defense in the first place. Although the Tenth Circuit 
recognizes the existence of a reasonable cause defense in Finley, 
even that court qualified its application, limiting the defense 
to efforts "that have been frustrated by circumstances outside 
the taxpayer's control." 123 F.3d at 1348. There is no 
indication here that such circumstances existed. 
Moreover, other courts have refused to follow the Tenth 
Circuit's approach. In a fact pattern similar to this case, one 
court said no reasonable cause defense existed for a responsible 
person who knew that taxes were due but paid other creditors 
instead of the government. Newsome v. United States, 431 F.2d 
742, 747 (5th Cir. 1970) . Another court suggested that the 
"reasonable cause" defense existed only in theory (surmising that 
in practice, an officer of a company would not have the defense). 
Bowen v. United States, 836 F.2d 965, 968 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(emphasis added.)2 
2
 Some federal circuits use a "reasonable cause" defense, 
but the circumstances in which it does apply are extremely 
narrow. See. Loaal v. United States, 195 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 
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These cases were in existence when the Legislature amended 
this section, but the Legislature declined to create a reasonable 
cause defense under Utah law. There is ambiguity and a lack of 
adoption of a uniform standard by the federal courts. By relying 
upon such federal reasoning, the court has failed to apply Utah 
law. Consequently, the Court of Appeals' reliance on federal 
case law to create this defense is misplaced, and this Court 
should reverse the court's action on that matter. 
C. The Court of Appeals' Failure to Defer to the Factual 
Findings of the Commission and Resulted in a Decision 
at Odds With the Statutory Scheme Outlined in Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-302(7) . 
This Court should reversed the decision of the Court of 
Appeals because the court failed to apply the facts of this case 
to the statutory scheme outlined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7). 
Under this section, prima facie evidence of a person's failure to 
collect, truthfully account for, or pay taxes due exists if "a 
1999) (holding "that the reasonable cause defense to a § 6672 
action is exceedingly limited"); Thosteson v. United States, 331 
F.3d 1294, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that the court has 
"consistently held that the reasonable cause defense to a § 6672 
action is extremely limited")(emphasis added); Brewery, Inc. v. 
United States, 33 F.3d 589 (6th Cir. 1994), (holding that a 
personal penalty assessment was upheld because taxes are held as 
trust funds of the government, and use of those funds to pay 
other creditors cannot constitute "reasonable cause" for limiting 
penalties). (For a discussion of tax funds as trust funds, see 
Argument III, infra at 23-25.) But see East Wind Industries, 
Inc. v. United States, 196 F.3d 499 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that 
financial difficulties may be a factor to consider when 
determining whether a reasonable cause defense exists) . 
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responsible party . . . recklessly disregarded obvious or known 
risks, which resulted in the failure to collect, account for, or 
pay over the tax." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7) (b) (ii). (2000). 
The facts of this case bear repeating here. Stevenson 
conceded he is a responsible person. Stevenson, 2005 UT App 17 9, 
58, 112 P.3d at 1234. In its Final Decision, the Commission 
determined that Stevenson had "recklessly disregarded obvious 
risks that resulted in the failure to pay over the tax." (R. at 
7.) Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7), a personal penalty may 
be assessed against a responsible person if that person has 
"recklessly disregarded obvious risks that resulted in the 
failure to pay over the tax." 
In spite of these facts, the court still concluded Stevenson 
had been "negligent," not "reckless." Stevenson, 2005 UT App 
179, at 517, 112 P.3d at 1236. First, the court observed that 
"Stevenson did not have actual notice of Tower's tax deficiency 
until some time around November 2000." Id. Without actual 
notice, the court reasoned, "[payment of] withholding taxes for 
three quarters is not sufficient to present an obvious risk of 
non payment to a responsible party who is not directly involved 
in the accounting and disbursing of taxes." Id. Second, 
according to the court, the fact that the withholding taxes had 
b e e n paid in 1999 did not give Stevenson any reason to believe 
that taxes would not be paid in 2000. It seized upon the 
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reasoning in this relatively obscure bankruptcy case to support 
its creation of a defense. 
The Commission, however, weighed the evidence and found as a 
matter of fact that, given Petitioner had sole check-signing 
authority for Tower, if he was not signing checks to pay tax 
owed, no one else was. (R. at 4.) Since Stephenson had signed 
checks and tax returns in 1999, he knew, or should have known, 
that fact. (R. at 7.) Moreover, the fact that Steckelberg, the 
corporate partner in charge of day-to-day operations, had 
declared bankruptcy twice--a fact known to Stevenson—was an 
obvious risk that should have compelled better oversight on the 
part of Stevenson. (R. at 285.) Given these facts which were 
before the Commission, the court erred in ignoring the considered 
facts and concluding that Stevenson was merely negligent and not 
reckless. The Court should reverse the court's decision for its 
failure to consider the factual basis for the Commission's Order. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE OPINION OF THE COURT OF 
APPEALS BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY 
CONSTRUED UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-302(7) IN DETERMINING 
WHETHER STEVENSON PREFERRED OTHER CREDITORS OVER THE 
STATE GOVERNMENT. 
As articulated above, supra at 10-12, the same arguments 
surrounding willfulness and reckless disregard also apply when 
determining whether Stevenson preferred other creditors over the 
Tax Commission in handling the tax dollars he held as trust 
funds. As with the standard of what constitutes reckless 
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disregard of obvious or known risks, Utah law also provides a 
definite standard on how to determine what constitutes a prima 
facie case for willfulness which the federal statute does not. 
Under Utah law, 
Tilt is prima facie evidence that a person has willfully 
failed to collect, truthfully account for, or pay over any 
of the taxes . . . if the commission . . . finds that the 
person charged with the responsibility of collecting, 
accounting for, or paying over the taxes: 
(i) made a voluntary, conscious, and intentional 
decision to prefer other creditors over the state 
government . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7) (b) (i) (2000) (emphasis added). 
This Court should reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals 
because the Court of Appeals erroneously construed Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-1-302(7)(b) in determining that Stevenson did not 
voluntarily, consciously, or intentionally prefer other creditors 
over the Tax Commission in satisfying Tower's debts and 
obligations. In analyzing Stevenson's actions, the court 
determined that he had not violated this provision of Utah law. 
This determination was in error and should be corrected by this 
Court. 
Stevenson's decision to prefer other creditors over the 
state government deals with his actions surrounding the release 
of XO Communications's $8 3,211 payment to Tower. As recounted 
above, Stevenson used personal funds to extinguish the claims of 
Tower's subcontractors in order to facilitate the release of the 
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money owed to Tower. When this check was issued, Tower, with 
Stevenson signing the agreement on behalf of Tower, agreed that 
the check would go directly to the Bank of Utah, not to the 
corporation or to the State. (R. at 38-42.) 
The Court of Appeals relied on Sorenson v. United States, 
521 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1975), to determine that Stevenson's 
actions to use personal funds to extinguish Tower's obligations 
did not make Stevenson a responsible person. Under Sorenson, 
"funds placed at the disposition of a company become corporate 
funds regardless of their source, be it a bank or an owner of th< 
company." Stevenson, 2005 UT App 179, 122, 112 P.3d at 1237. 
The court's analysis that Stevenson's actions did not 
violate Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7) was erroneous in two ways. 
First, the line the Court of Appeals drew to distinguish the 
facts of Sorenson and this case is too fine, and results in a 
distinction without difference. The court incorrectly 
distinguishes Stevenson from Sorenson because in Sorenson, the 
officer allegedly had greater financial oversight than Stevenson 
had over Tower. Stevenson, 2005 UT App 179, 122, 112 P.3d at 
1237. But Stevenson did have authority that subjects him to 
greater liability than the Court of Appeals recognized. As in 
Sorenson, Stevenson used personal funds to satisfy the payment of 
Tower liabilities. Then, through Stevenson's actions as the 
force behind the company since he was the only officer acting for 
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it, Tower received a substantial payment from one of its clients. 
After taking charge of the company, Stevenson entered into 
contracts on Tower's behalf. He personally intervened and 
orchestrated XO Communications's payment owed to Tower. See 
Addendum D. He signed a contract on behalf of Tower—the terms 
of which specified that payment should go to Tower. But then, he 
personally directed that the payment go to Bank of Utah, one of 
Tower's secured creditors, on a claim Stevenson had personally 
guaranteed. Id. This action demonstrates that Stevenson, by 
signing, had sufficient capacity to act on Tower's behalf, 
contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Appeals. 
The second analytical misstep deals with the Court of 
Appeals' conclusion that the Tax Commission could not assess a 
personal penalty against Stevenson because the Commission failed 
to "present evidence that the Bank of Utah declined to exercise 
its right to the XO funds and that Stevenson was free to apply a 
portion of the fund to pay Tower's tax obligation." Stevenson, 
2005 UT App 179, 123, 112 P.3d at 1237. No such action by a 
creditor is needed, according to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7), to 
find an officer liable. 
Moreover, The Court of Appeals ignored the fact that these 
tax payments were "trust funds" of the State. Under Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-10-406 (6) (2000), the Commission had a lien against the 
assets of Tower for taxes owed but not paid to the state: 
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(6) Each employer who deducts and withholds any amount 
under this part shall hold the amount in trust for the 
state of Utah for the payment of it to the commission 
in the manner and at the time provided for in this 
part. So long as any delinquency continues, the state 
of Utah shall have a lien to secure the payment of any 
amount withheld . . . upon all the assets of the 
employer and all the property owned or used by the 
employer in the conduct of his business. This lien 
shall be prior to any lien or any kind, including 
existing liens for taxes. (Emphasis added.) 
"Trust funds" are always property of the state. They are never 
permitted to be used for any purpose other than for taxes. If 
and when those funds are spent out of trust by the custodian, the 
statute above creates a priority lien on all assets or property 
used or owned by the employer.3 
The Court of Appeals erroneously extrapolates federal case 
law to excuse Stephenson's use of personal funds for corporate 
purposes, and the XO account receivable for paying the bank. As 
the officer in control of the company at the time, all of those 
funds were at least doubly encumbered to both the state of Utah 
and the Bank of Utah. The Court required the Commission to show 
evidence that the bank gave up its claim to all funds before 
3
 There were no facts in the record to resolve a priority 
dispute between the State and the Bank of Utah, and that is not 
necessary in resolving this issue. But this Court has previously 
looked at the withholding tax lien priority statute in A.C. 
Financial, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 948 P.2d 771 (Utah 1997); 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Waastaff 450 P.2d 100 (Utah 1969); and 
Union Central Life Insurance Co. v. Black, 247 P. 486 (Utah 
1926). All that is important here is to show that the State also 
had a valid lien at the time of the payments orchestrated by 
Stevenson. 
21 
Stephenson would be liable. This was in error, however, because 
those funds used for company purposes were already liened to the 
Commission. 
Although there is no evidence that other officers of the 
Bank of Utah knew about Tower's tax obligations and had no notice 
of such, Stevenson did. He knew that Tower owed the Commission, 
but instead of paying the taxes owed, he intervened on behalf of 
his employer, the Bank of Utah, to direct XO Communication's 
payment to the bank instead of Tower or the State. Stevenson's 
own actions foreclose him from claiming a reasonable cause 
defense for his actions. This Court should reverse the Court of 
Appeals. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD CORRECT THE DECISION BELOW BY 
APPLYING THE DEFERENTIAL "SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE" 
STANDARD OF REVIEW TO THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT, REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-610. 
This Court should reverse the Court of Appeals' decision 
because the Court of Appeals disregarded the "substantial 
evidence" standard applicable to its judicial review of the Tax 
Commission's findings of fact. The Supreme Court reviews the 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals for correctness pursuant to 
its grant of certiorari. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 525, 63 P.3d at 
660, (quoting Lonqlev, 2000 UT 69, 113, 9 P.3d at 765). In this 
case, the "[t]he correctness of the court of appeals' decision 
depends initially upon whether it applied the appropriate 
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standard of review to the [Commission's] decision." Carrier, 944 
P.2d at 350. 
The appropriate standard of review that the court should 
have applied in reviewing this case below appears in Utah Code 
Ann. § 59-1-610. Under subsection (1)(a), the Court of Appeals 
"shall grant the commission deference concerning its written 
findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard of 
review" when it reviews "formal adjudicative proceedings before 
the commission." See Yearqin, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 2001 UT 
11, Sill, 20 P. 3d 287, 291. In applying a substantial evidence 
standard, "the court of appeals must uphold those findings of 
fact that are supported by substantial evidence, or ^that quantum 
and quality of relevant evidence which is adequate to convince a 
reasonable mind to support a conclusion.'" Id. (quoting Schmidt 
v. Utah State Tax Commission, 1999 UT 48, 17, 980 P.2d 690, 692). 
The Court of Appeals erred by ignoring several key factual 
findings made by the Tax Commission that would not support the 
Court's decision. The Court of Appeals did not defer to the Tax 
Commission, notwithstanding the substantial evidence presented at 
the Commission hearing and in the record that unequivocally met 
the prima facie criteria. The evidence of Stevenson's failure to 
investigate mismanagement, alone, is sufficient to sustain the 
Commission. 
Stevenson signed corporate tax returns for the second and 
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fourth quarters for 1999. (R. at 55-56.) Stevenson signed 
checks paying withholding taxes for the second and fourth quarter 
tax returns for 1999. (R. at 55-56, 265-66). Stevenson signed 
all checks for all tax payments prior to, and including, the 
first quarter of 2000. (R. at 266). No checks were tendered, 
nor returns filed, for the second, third, and fourth quarters of 
2000. (R. at 266-67.) Stevenson met Steckelberg once or twice a 
month during 1999 and 2000. (R. at 242.) Stevenson knew 
Steckelberg had previously filed bankruptcy and did not have 
check-signing authority. (R. at 3-5.) 
The Commission made these findings which would fit all three 
prongs of the prima facie case of willfulness; by statute the 
Commission was entitled to deference. By failing to give proper 
deference to these factual findings, the court failed to satisfy 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610, which require the court to give 
deference to the factual findings of the Commission. As a 
factual matter, Stevenson was made aware of the financial 
difficulties experienced by Tower. Stevenson used his own funds 
to secure the releases against Tower so that it could receive 
payment of a large sum from XO Communications, one of its 
debtors. However, instead of directing Tower's accounts 
receivable directly to Tower for disbursal to Tower's creditors, 
Stevenson orchestrated the payment of XO Communication7 s payment 
directly to the Bank of Utah instead of to Tower itself. 
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In bypassing Tower, Stevenson preferred one creditor, the 
Bar ik :xf Utah, over the State, :i i 1 , E>|: :i t€ • • : f !::]: le C TJT i - - '• c *- ' 
superior claim to Tower's funds. This orchestration shows that 
Stevenson violated Utah r'i HIP Ann, § 59-1-302(7). " decision of 
the Court of Appeals should be reversed since it failed to pay 
proper deference the Commission's findings. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, tlle Commission respectfully asks 
the Court to reverse the/decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. cne/( 
DATED this ^J> day of October, 2005. 
GALE Kj./FRANCIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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JACKSON, Judge: 
Hi Eric Stevenson appeals the Utah Tax Commission's 
(Commission) personal penalty assessment for failure to collect, 
truthfully account for, and pay the withholding taxes owed by 
Tower Communications, Inc. (Tower) for the second, third, and 
fourth quarters of 2000 under Utah Code section 59-1-302. See 
Utah Code § 59-1-302(2) (1994). We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
f2 In 1999 Stevenson, Brett N. Cherry, and Ken Steckelberg 
organized Tower as equal partners, with Steckelberg acting as 
president and Stevenson as secretary/treasurer. Steckelberg was 
in charge of day-to-day operations of the company, while 
Stevenson processed all company payments and had sole authority 
to sign checks on the company's behalf. 
1(3 Stevenson also worked full-time as a loan officer at the 
Bank of Utah and would only visit Tower's offices about once a 
month. To accomplish his duties with Tower, he relied on a 
bookkeeper to organize Tower's finances and prepare checks for 
him to sign. At least on some occasions, Stevenson would sign 
these checks without reviewing invoices or company records. 
f4 Stevenson would occasionally inquire to Steckelberg about 
the finances of the company. Steckelberg assured him all was 
well; however, beginning with the second quarter of 2000, the 
bookkeeper did not present Stevenson with checks for Tower's 
withholding taxes. The problem continued for the third and 
fourth quarter. The bookkeeper never prepared checks for these 
taxes, and Stevenson apparently never noticed. 
f5 Third parties alerted Stevenson to problems within the 
company, and he confronted Steckelberg sometime in November 2000. 
Unsatisfied with Steckelberg's assurances, Stevenson had an 
accountant review Tower's records and discovered that, among 
other financial problems, the withholding taxes had not been 
paid. Stevenson took immediate action, dissolving the business 
and terminating Steckelberg's employment with Cherry's help. 
%6 At the time, Tower owed Stevenson's employer, Bank of Utah, 
a considerable amount of money on a loan secured by Tower's 
accounts receivable and other assets. To pay off this loan, 
Stevenson arranged to collect Tower's largest receivable from XO 
Communications, which owed Tower approximately $83,000. Payment 
of this amount had been impeded by the claims of several 
subcontractors and suppliers whom Tower had not yet paid. To 
remedy the problem, Stevenson provided about $16,000 of his 
personal funds to buy the claims of the subcontractors and 
suppliers, and thereby obligate XO Communications to pay off its 
account to Tower. Stevenson entered into an agreement with XO 
Communications on November 15, 2001 to have this amount paid 
directly to the Bank of Utah. XO transferred this money to the 
bank on December 7, 2 0 01, and it was used to pay off the loan. 
None of the money was used to pay Tower's delinquent withholding 
taxes. 
f7 On July 12, 2002, the Commission notified Stevenson that a 
personal penalty of $12,018.04 had been assessed against him for 
Tower's unpaid withholding taxes. Stevenson requested a hearing, 
which was held on August 5, 2003, and thirteen days later, the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Commission issued her 
determination that Stevenson (1) was a party responsible for 
payment and (2) had willfully failed to pay Tower's withholding 
taxes under Utah Code section 59-1-302(2). 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
f8 On appeal, Stevenson concedes that he is a party 
responsible for payment of the taxes but contests the 
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Commission's conclusion that his failure to pay was w i m u i . 
Specifically, he claims the Commission has failed to provide 
prima facie evidence of willfulness under Utah Code section r9 " 
3 02(7) (b) , and even if it has, he urges us to adopt the 
"reasonable cause" defense to nonpayment articulated by the Tenth 
Circuit's en banc decision in Finlev v. United States, 123 F.3d 
1342, 1347-48 (1997). Both of these issues are questions of 
first impression for Utah courts. 
%9 The. standard of review for tax cases is defined by statute. 
We must "grant the [Cjommission deference concerning its written, 
findings of fact, applying a substantial evidence standard on 
review" and "grant the [Cjommission no deference concerning its 
conclusions of law, applying a correction of error standard, 
unless there is an explicit grant of discretion contained in a 
statute at issue," Utah Code Ann. § 59 -1 610(1 ) (a) (b) (.2004). 
1(10 Because Stevenson doc — , ca^ienge the ALJ' s written 
findii igs of fact, we need only determine whether our review of 
the ALJ'.: willfulness determination presents a question of fact 
or a question of law. The Commission argues that the willfulness 
determination presents a question of fact,, citing to the Tenth 
Circuit's treatment of the similar willfulness standard used in 
federal tax law. See Bradshaw v. United States, 83 F.3d 1175, 
1183 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that "[o]ur prior decisions have 
. . . treated [the issue of willfulness] as an issue of fact"). 
We disagree with, this characterization and conclude, as does the 
Tenth Circuit in its more recent cases, that the issue of 
willfulness in tax cases presents a mixed question of law and 
fact. See Finley, 123 F.3d at 1348 (en banc) (recognizing that 
established factual paradigms may be used to "identify willful 
conduct as a matter of law" but that: taxpayers should be allowed 
a "delimited opportunity to demonstrate to a jury there was 
reasonable cause suffin" ^ nt { .- :-use failure to pay the 
withholding taxes"), 
11XI As disc. , . .. .;x L J A L L'U. - . i;t.-. -. 'GUT section br i-
302(7) (b) pei.\.L:J the Commission to present prima facie evidence 
of willfulness by demonstrating that the responsible party 
"recklessly disregarded obvious or known risks" of nonpayment or 
"made a voluntary, conscious, and intentional decision to prefer 
other creditors over the state government.1' Utah Code Ann, § 59-
1-302(7) (b) (i)-(ii). We conclude that the question of whether 
the Commission has presented prima facie evidence is a question 
of law, see Sheikh v. Department of Pub. Safety, 9 04 P.2d 2 3 03, 
1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Whether a party has failed to 
establish a prima facie case is a question of I aw."), which we 
review for correctness Utah Code Ann, § 59-1-610(1) (b) . 
Because the ALJ did no: i::ame its ruling :i n terms of pri ma fa.c:i! e 
evi dence, we will tr-at its conclusions with regard to 
Stevenson's recklessness and preference as a ruling on the 
Commission's prima facie evidence. 
fl2 Once prima facie evidence is presented, the taxpayer assumes 
the burden of disproving willfulness. This is a factual 
question, which we review for "substantial evidence." Id. § 59-
1-610(1) (a) . 
ANALYSIS 
I. Statutory Framework 
fl3 By law, employers are required to pay quarterly withholding 
taxes one month after each quarter ends. See id. § 59-10-
406(1) (a) (2000) . When a business fails to pay withholding 
taxes, the Commission may assess a personal penalty for all such 
outstanding taxes against persons in the business who are 
responsible for paying the taxes but willfully fail to do so: 
Any person required to collect, truthfully 
account for, and pay over any [withholding] 
tax . . . who willfully fails to collect the 
tax, fails to truthfully account for and pay 
over the tax, or attempts in any manner to 
evade or defeat any tax or payment of the 
tax, shall be liable for a penalty equal to 
the total amount of the tax evaded, not 
collected, not accounted for, or not paid 
over. 
Id. § 59-1-302 (2)~. 
tl4 In determining whether a responsible person has willfully 
failed to pay the tax, the ALJ or the reviewing court "shaill 
consider any inference and evidence that a person has willfully 
failed to collect, truthfully account for, or pay over any 
[withholding] tax." Id. § 59-1-302(7)(a). But, the "court need 
not find a bad motive or specific intent to defraiud the 
government or deprive it of revenue to establish willfulness." 
Id. § 59-1-302(7) (c) . Under the statute, " [i]t is prima facie 
evidence that a person has willfully failed to collect, 
truthfully account for, or pay over any [withholding] taxes . . . 
if the commission or a court finds that the person charged with 
the responsibility for collecting, accounting for, or paying over 
the taxes" did any of the following: 
(i) made a voluntary, conscious, and 
intentional decision to prefer other 
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creditors over the state government or 
utilize the tax money for personal purposes; 
(ii) recklessly disregarded obvious or known 
risks, which resulted in the failure to 
collect, account for, or pay over the tax; or 
(iii) failed to investigate or to correct 
mismanagement, having notice that the tax was 
not or is not being collected, accounted for, 
or paid over as provided by law. 
Id. § 59-1-302(7)(b). 
fl5 No Utah caselaw has yet defined "willfulness11 for tax 
purposes, but federal cases interpreting 26 U.S.C. section 6672 
apply a similar standard1 and provide some insight. Under the 
federal law, "'[m]ere negligence'" is insufficient to prove 
willfulness, but by the same token, "'it is not necessary that 
there be present an intent to defraud or to deprive the 
[government] of the taxes due, nor need bad motives or wicked 
design be proved in order to constitute willfulness.1" Cook v. 
United States, 52 Fed. CI. 62, 69 (2002) (citation omitted); see 
also Denbo v. United States, 988 F.2d 1029, 1033 (10th Cir. 1993) 
(" [N]egligence does not give rise to section 6673 liability."). 
II. The Commission's Prima Facie Evidence of Willfulness 
fl6 The ALJ concluded that Stevenson had willfully failed to pay 
Tower's withholding taxes for two reasons. First, he 
demonstrated a "reckless disregard of an obvious risk that 
withholding taxes were not being paid" because, as 
secretary/treasurer with sole authority to sign checks, he should 
1. Much like Utah Code section 59-1-302(2), 26 U.S.C. section 
6672 (a) provides that 
[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully 
account for, and pay over any tax imposed by 
this title who willfully fails to collect 
such tax, or truthfully account for and pay 
over such tax, . . . shall, in addition to 
other penalties provided by law, be liable to 
a penalty equal to the total amount of the 
tax evaded, or not collected, or not 
accounted for and paid over. 
26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (2000). Also like the Utah statute, federal 
courts have held that willfulness may be shown by proving that 
the taxpayer either (1) made a voluntary preference to another 
creditor or (2) recklessly disregarded a known or obvious risk of 
nonpayment. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 52 Fed. CI. 62, 69 
(2002) . 
have been aware that the company had not paid taxes for the 
quarters in question. Second, the ALJ also concluded that 
Stevenson had "made a voluntary, conscious, and intentional 
decision to prefer the Bank of Utah over the state of Utah when 
he was able to obtain payment on [XO Communication's] obligation 
to Tower." 
A. Recklessness 
1(17 Stevenson first argues that the ALJ erred in its 
determination of recklessness. He claims that, although he 
failed to personally assure that the withholding taxes were being 
paid, his omission amounts to mere negligence, not recklessness. 
We agree. Given the ALJ's factual finding that Stevenson did not 
have actual notice of Tower's tax deficiency until some time 
around November 2000, the Commission must prove that he ignored 
an "obvious risk" of nonpayment. Generally, for a risk of 
nonpayment to be obvious, the company must have had a history of 
failing to pay taxes that would place the responsible party on 
notice. See, e.g., Hammon v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 14 (1990) 
(determining taxpayer was reckless when he knew of company's tax 
deficiencies for prior years and failed to institute safeguards 
to assure payment). But, absent actual notice, the fact that a 
company has not paid withholding taxes for three quarters is not 
sufficient to present an obvious risk of nonpayment to a 
responsible party who is not directly involved in the accounting 
and disbursement of taxes. See In re Macagnone, 253 B.R. 99, 102 
(M.D. Fla. 2000) (determining that f'[t]he three quarters in 
question were the first delinquencies in the life of [the 
company]" and that, "[w]hile it is true that [the responsible 
party] did not inquire about the status of the taxes, it is clear 
. . . that his failure to do so, absent a history of delinquency, 
does not equal reckless disregard"). We therefore conclude that 
the Commission has not provided prima facie evidence that 
Stevenson recklessly disregarded known or obvious risks of 
nonpayment. 
B. Preference to Other Creditors 
fl8 Next, Stevenson challenges the ALJ's determination that he 
preferred the Bank of Utah over the state of Utah when he paid 
Tower's accounts receivable to the bank. Again, looking to 
federal law for guidance, we agree that a person has voluntarily 
and intentionally preferred other creditors over the government 
if he or she paid other creditors while he (1) "had actual 
knowledge of the specific tax delinquency for which the penalty 
was assessed" and (2) had "unencumbered funds available to pay 
the taxes at the time the taxes came due." Ghandour v. United 
States, 36 Fed. CI. 53, 62 (1996) (emphasis omitted). Here, the 
first prong is met because Stevenson paid certain of Tower's 
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creditors after he had actual knowledge that Tower had failed to 
pay withholding taxes. Whether the second prong is met depends 
on whether the funds Stevenson used were "unencumbered" at the 
time and could have been applied to the tax deficiency. 
1J19 Federal courts have not agreed upon a uniform definition of 
"encumbered" in this context, but we rely on the definition 
offered in Honev v. United States, 963 F.2d 1083, 1090 (8th Cir. 
1992) : 
Funds are encumbered only where the taxpayer 
is legally obligated to use the funds for a 
purpose other than satisfying the preexisting 
employment tax liability and if that legal 
obligation is superior to the interest of the 
[government] in the funds. 
see also United States v. Kim, 111 F.3d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir. 
1997) (adopting Honey definition); In re Premo, 116 B.R. 515, 535 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990) (adopting similar definition). However, 
"the fact that funds are subject to a security interest does not 
itself warrant a finding that the funds are 'encumbered.'" In re 
Premo, 116 B.R. at 53 6. Rather, funds only become encumbered 
once a secured creditor restricts the company's use of the funds 
or otherwise intervenes to prevent payment of taxes. See Honey, 
963 P.2d at 1091-92 (determining funds were unencumbered when 
secured creditor had the option under the security agreement to 
restrict payment of secured funds, but did not exercise the 
option); In re Premo, 116 B.R. at 536 (determining funds were 
encumbered when secured creditor asserted control of accounts and 
only allowed payments for payroll and minimal operating 
expenses). 
1f2 0 Stevenson testified that Tower had no money in its account 
when he discovered the tax deficiency. But the Commission argues 
that Stevenson had two sources of unencumbered funds available at 
the time and that he used both to pay creditors in preference to 
the government. 
1. Personal Funds 
H21 First, the Commission argues that the $16,000 of Stevenson's 
personal funds he used to purchase subcontractor claims against 
Tower were unencumbered corporate funds because Stevenson had 
control over them and spent them to release the XO receivable for 
Tower's benefit. The Commission relies on Sorenson v. United 
States, 521 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1975), for the proposition that 
personal funds used for business ends are transformed into 
unencumbered business funds for tax purposes. In Sorenson, the 
owner of a failing business "loaned" his personal funds to the 
business to pay net wages to employees. See id. at 327. The 
court held that these funds were "funds of the corporation" 
because they were "deposited to the corporate account" and used 
for corporate purposes, namely, "the payment of corporate 
obligations." Id. The court then determined that the funds were 
unencumbered because Sorenson controlled them and could have 
easily applied them to the withholding taxes for the wages he 
paid. See id. 
1|22 We agree with the central holding of Sorenson, that funds 
placed at the disposition of a company become corporate funds 
regardless of their source, be it a bank or an owner of the 
company. We also agree that Stevenson's personal funds were used 
to benefit Tower by extinguishing the claims of subcontractors 
against it and facilitating XO's payment of its outstanding 
account. However, we cannot conclude that Stevenson had the same 
type of control over these funds that Sorenson exercised. The 
court in Sorenson noted that Sorenson had both "the duty and 
responsibility" to assure that withholding taxes were paid and 
therefore had the discretion to "prorate such funds as [were] 
available between the Government and the employees." Id. at 327-
29 (explaining that for every $100 Sorenson paid in wages, only 
$10 would be withheld, leaving employees with a claim, including 
interest, against the company for $11.11). Stevenson did not 
have a comparable responsibility to oversee the payment of wages 
or withholdings and, because his personal funds were used solely 
to facilitate payment of the XO account, we cannot impose on him 
an obligation to prorate some of those funds to the government. 
These funds were therefore not available to pay Tower's 
withholding taxes, and we deem them encumbered for purposes of 
our analysis. 
2. XO Communications Account Receivable 
123 Second, the Commission seems to presume that the $80,000 
paid by XO was unencumbered without presenting evidence of the 
fact. The record indicates that the Bank of Utah had a secured 
interest in all of Tower's accounts receivable, including the XO 
accounts, but does not indicate to what degree the bank asserted 
its interest or sought to control the use of the funds. There is 
some evidence that the bank may have been aggressive about 
collecting; Stevenson testified that the Bank of Utah was 
"probably pushing more than anyone in terms of getting paid and 
that made a very precarious [situation] since I was an officer of 
the bank." Nonetheless, the extent of the Bank of Utah's efforts 
remains unknown. In order to present prima facie evidence that 
Stevenson preferred the Bank of Utah over the state, the 
Commission has the burden to present further evidence that the XO 
funds were unencumbered. In other words, the Commission must 
present evidence that the Bank of Utah declined to exercise its 
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right to the XO funds and that Stevenson was free to apply a 
portion of the fund to pay Tower's tax obligation. 
CONCLUSION 
U24 In sum, the Commission has failed to present prima facie 
evidence that Stevenson willfully failed to pay Tower's 
withholding taxes, and we therefore reverse the ALJ's ruling. 
But, because we have defined the term "unencumbered funds" as an 
issue of first impression and because the record does not clearly 
address the issue, we remand the case to allow the Commission to 
present evidence that the XO funds were unencumbered. If proven, 
such a showing presents prima facie evidence of willfulness, see 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7) (b) , and the ALJ2 may presume 
Stevenson's nonpayment was willful unless Stevenson presents 
rebuttal evidence. See Black's Law Dictionary 579 (7th ed. 1999) 
(defining prima facie evidence as "[e]vidence that will establish 
a fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is 
produced"); Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1998) 
(" [P]rima facie evidence is 'that quantum of evidence that 
suffices for proof of a particular fact until the fact is 
contradicted by other evidence. . . .'" (citation and alteration 
omitted) ) . 
f25 Because the type of evidence Stevenson must present to rebut 
the Commission's prima facie evidence is not defined by the 
statute or by Utah caselaw, Stevenson urges us to adopt the 
"reasonable cause" standard defined by the Tenth Circuit's en 
banc decision in Finley v. United States, 123 F.3d 1342, 1348 
(1997). We agree that two aspects of that case are applicable 
here. First, we agree with the Tenth Circuit that, unless the 
Commission presents unrebutted prima facie evidence, the 
determination of willfulness is to be decided as a question of 
fact. See id. at 1346, 1348 (holding it essential that a 
taxpayer be allowed "to meaningfully distinguish his case before 
a jury based on the relative degree of willfulness or the 
presence of extenuating circumstances"). Second, we agree that a 
taxpayer may rebut evidence of willfulness by proving "reasonable 
cause," namely, that "(1) the taxpayer has made reasonable 
efforts to protect the [withholding tax] trust funds, but (2) 
those efforts have been frustrated by circumstances outside the 
taxpayer's control." Id. at 1348. Proof of "reasonable cause" 
2. Of course, the same procedure would apply in a district court 
proceeding. District courts "have jurisdiction to review by 
trial de novo all decisions issued by the [tax] commission . . . 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-1-601(1) (2004). 
was not specifically considered in the ALJ's ruling, but we 
conclude that it could, if proven, provide a defense to prima 
facie evidence of willfulness. 
f 26 Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
Norman H. Jackson ,/>Judge 
f27 WE CONCUR: 
•TnH-it-Vi M "R i 1 1 i n r rc U Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
/ 
Russell W. Bench, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
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ADDENDUM B 
UtahC mil Mm l: S1" I 02(2000) 
§ 59-1-302 (2000). Penalty for nonpayment of sales, use, withholding, or fuels taxes -
Jeopardy proceedings. 
(1) The provisions of this section apply to the following taxes in this title: 
(a) state and local sales and use tax under Chapter 12, Parts 1 and 2; 
(b) transient room tax under Chapter 12, Part 3; 
(c) resort communities tax under Chapter 12, Part 4; 
(d) public transit tax under Chapter 12, Part 5; 
(e) tourism, recreation, cultural, and convention facilities tax under Chapter 12, Part 6; 
(f) motor fuel, clean fuel, special fuel, and aviation fuel taxes under Chapter 13, Parts 2, 
3, and 4; and 
(g) withholding tax under Chapter 10, Part 4. 
(2) Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax listed in 
Subsection (1) who willfully fails to collect the tax, fails to truthfully account for and pay over 
the tax, or attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax or the payment of the tax, shall be 
liable for a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, not collected, not accounted for, 
or not paid over. This penalty is in addition to other penalties provided by law. 
(3) (a) If the commission determines in accordance with Subsection (2) that a person is liable for 
the penalty, the commission shall notify the taxpayer of the proposed penalty. 
(b) The notice of proposed penalty shall: 
(i) set forth the basis of the assessment; and 
(ii) be mailed by registered mail, postage prepaid, to the person's last-known 
address. 
(4) Upon receipt of the notice of proposed penalty, the person against whom the penalty is 
proposed may: 
(a) pay the amount of the proposed penalty at the place and time stated in the notice; or 
(b) proceed in accordance with the review procedures of Subsection (5). 
(5) Any person against whom a penalty has been proposed in accordance with Subsections (2) 
and (3) may contest the proposed penalty by filing a petition for an adjudicative proceeding with 
the commission. 
(6) If the commission determines thai I he collection of the penalty is in jeopardy, nothing in this 
section may prevent the immediate collection of the penalty in accordance with the procedures 
and requirements for emergency proceedings in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative 
Procedures Act. 
(7) (a) In any hearing before the commission and in any judicial review of the hearing, the 
commission and the court shall consider any inference and evidence that a person has willfully 
failed to collect, truthfully account for, or pay over any tax listed in Subsection (1). 
(b) It is prima facie evidence that a person has willfully failed to collect, truthfully 
account for, or pay over any of the taxes listed in Subsection (1) if the commission or a 
court finds that the person charged with the responsibility of collecting, accounting for, 
or paying over the taxes: 
(i) made a voluntary, conscious, and intentional decision to prefer other creditors 
over the state government or utilize the tax money for personal purposes; 
(ii) recklessly disregarded obvious or known risks, which resulted in the failure to 
collect, account for, or pay over the tax; or 
(iii) failed to investigate or to correct mismanagement, having notice that the tax 
was not or is not being collected, accounted for, or paid over as provided by law. 
(c) The commission or court need not find a bad motive or specific intent to defraud the 
government or deprive it of revenue to establish willfulness under this section. 
(d) If the commission determines that a person is liable for the penalty under Subsection 
(2), the commission shall assess the penalty and give notice and demand for payment. 
The notice and demand for payment shall be mailed by registered mail, postage prepaid, 
to the person's last-known address. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-10-406 (\\ i si '(NM i 
§ 59-1 (I 'HH» Collection and payment of tax 
» i i . 
(6) Each employer who deducts and withholds any amount under this part shall hold the amount 
in trust for the state of Utah for the payment of it to the commission in the manner and at the 
time provided for in this part. So long as any delinquency continues, the state of Utah shall have 
a lien to secure the payment of any amounts withheld, and not remitted as provided under this 
section, upon all of the assets of the employer and all property owned or used by the employer in 
the conduct of his business, including stock-in-trade, business fixtures, and equipment. This lien 
shall be prior to any lien of any kind, including existing liens for taxes. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-610 (West 2004) 
§ 59-1-610. Standard of review of appellate court 
(1) When reviewing formal adjudicative proceedings commenced before the commission, the 
Court of Appeals or Supreme Court shall: 
(a) grant the commission deference concerning its written findings of fact, applying a 
substantial evidence standard on review; and 
(b) grant the commission no deference concerning its conclusions of law, applying a 
correction of error standard, unless there is an explicit grant of discretion contained in a 
statute at issue before the appellate court. 
(2) This section supercedes Section 63-46b-16 pertaining to judicial review of formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
26 U.S.CA. § 6672 (2000) 
§ 6672. Failure to collect and pay over tax, or attempt to evade or defeat tax. 
(a) General rule.-Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax 
imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over 
such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment 
thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the 
total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. No penalty 
shall be imposed under section 6653 or part II of subchapter A of chapter 68 for any offense to 
which this section is applicable. 
(b) Preliminary notice requirement— 
(1) In general.-No penalty shall be imposed under subsection (a) unless the Secretary 
notifies the taxpayer in writing by mail to an address as determined under section 6212(b) 
or in person that the taxpayer shall be subject to an assessment of such penalty. 
(2) Timing of notice.—The mailing of the notice described in paragraph (1) (or, in the 
case of such a notice delivered in person, such delivery) shall precede any notice and 
demand of any penalty under subsection (a) by at least 60 days. 
(3) Statute of limitations.—If a notice described in paragraph (1) with respect to any 
penalty is mailed or delivered in person before the expiration of the period provided by 
section 6501 for the assessment of such penalty (determined without regard to this 
paragraph), the period provided by such section for the assessment of such penalty shall 
not expire before the later of— 
(A) the date 90 days after the date on w huh sin h notice was mailed or delivered 
in person, or 
(B) if there is a timely protest of the proposed assessment, the date 30 days after 
the Secretary makes a final administrative determination with respect to such 
protest. 
(4) Exception for jeopardy.-This subsection shall not apply if the Secretary finds that 
the collection of the penalty is in jeopardy. 
(c) Extension of period of collection where bond is filed.— 
(1) In general.—If, within 30 days after the day on which notice and demand of any 
penalty under subsection (a) is made against any person, such person-
(A) pays an amount which is not less than the minimum amount required to 
commence a proceeding in court with respect to his liability for such penalty, 
(B) files a claim for refund of the amount so paid, and 
(C) furnishes a bond which meets the requirements of paragraph (3), no levy or 
proceeding in court for the collection of the remainder of such penalty shall be 
made, begun, or prosecuted until a final resolution of a proceeding begun as 
provided in paragraph (2). Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421 (a), the 
beginning of such proceeding or levy during the time such prohibition is in force 
may be enjoined by a proceeding in the proper court. Nothing in this paragraph 
shall be construed to prohibit any counterclaim for the remainder of such penalty 
in a proceeding begun as provided in paragraph (2). 
(2) Suit must be brought to determine liability for penalty.-If, within 30 days after 
the day on which his claim for refund with respect to any penalty under subsection (a) is 
denied, the person described in paragraph (1) fails to begin a proceeding in the 
appropriate United States district court (or in the Court of Claims) for the determination 
of his liability for such penalty, paragraph (1) shall cease to apply with respect to such 
penalty, effective on the day following the close of the 30-day period referred to in this 
paragraph. 
(3) Bond.—The bond referred to in paragraph (1) shall be in such form and with such 
sureties as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe and shall be in an amount equal to 
1 1/2 times the amount of excess of the penalty assessed over the payment described in 
paragraph (1). 
(4) Suspension of running of period of limitations on collection.—The running of the 
period of limitations provided in section 6502 on the collection by levy or by a 
proceeding in court in respect of any penalty described in paragraph (1) shall be 
suspended for the period during which the Secretary is prohibited from collecting by levy 
or a proceeding in court. 
(5) Jeopardy collection.—If the Secretary makes a finding that the collection of the 
penalty is in jeopardy, nothing in this subsection shall prevent the immediate collection 
of such penalty. 
(d) Right of contribution where more than 1 person liable for penalty.—If more than 1 
person is liable for the penalty under subsection (a) with respect to any tax, each person who 
paid such penalty shall be entitled to recover from other persons who are liable for such penalty 
an amount equal to the excess of the amount paid by such person over such person's 
proportionate share of the penalty. Any claim for such a recovery may be made only in a 
proceeding which is separate from, and is not joined or consolidated with— 
(1) an action for collection of such penalty brought by the United States, or 
(2) a proceeding in which the United States files a counterclaim or third-party complaint 
for the collection of such penalty. 
(e) Exception for voluntary board members of tax-exempt organizations.-No penalty shall 
be imposed by subsection (a) on any unpaid, volunteer member of any board of trustees or 
directors of an organization exempt from tax under subtitle A if such member— 
(1) is solely serving in an honorary capacity, 
(2) does not participate in the day-to-day or financial operations of the organization, and 
(3) does not have actual knowledge of the failure on which such penalty is imposed. The 
preceding sentence shall not apply if it results in no person being liable for the penalty 
imposed by subsection (a). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on August 5, 2003. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The assessment in question is a personal penalty assessment, made against Petitioner for the unpaid quarterly 
withholding taxes of Tower Communications, Inc., a Utah corporation in which Petitioner was both part owner 
and officer. 
2. The periods at issue are the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2000. 
3. In 1999, Petitioner, organized Tower Communications, Inc. ("Tower"), with Brett N. Cheny ("Cherry"), and 
Ken Steckelberg ("Steckelberg"). Each organizer was issued a one-third ownership in Tower. Petitioner 
retained his one-third ownership until Tower was closed. 
4. Throughout Tower's existence, Petitioner held the position of Secretary/Treasurer. In addition, Petitioner was 
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the sole authorized signer on the company's checking account. As such, Petitioner was ultimately responsible 
for processing all company payments. Tower's bookkeeper would prepare all checks and bring them to 
Petitioner for his signature. Petitioner acknowledges that he signed checks for Tower without reviewing 
invoices or company records. 
5. The bookkeeper had not prepared and submitted to Petitioner, for his signature, checks for the withholding tax 
payments for the three quarters at issue. Petitioner claims that even so he was unaware that the taxes had not 
been paid. However, Petitioner was the only person who could sign a check for payment of the taxes. 
6. During the period at issue Petitioner worked full time at the Bank of Utah as a loan officer and his office was 
not at the same location as Tower's place of business. Petitioner did visit Tower's offices, approximately once 
per month during the period at issue. 
7. Steckelberg held the position of President and managed the day-to-day operations of Tower. 
8. Petitioner would occasionally ask Steckelberg about the finances of Tower and during the period at issue was 
told that everything was fine. He became concerned when he heard of problems from third parties and he asked 
Steckelberg for more specific information sometime around November 2000. He was not satisfied with 
Steckelberg's answers at this point so he went to Tower's office and had an accountant review the financial 
records of the business. At that point he learned of the tax deficiency as well as other financial problems. 
Petitioner and Cherry then dissolved the business and terminated Steckelberg. 
9. Quarterly withholding taxes were properly filed and paid by Tower in 1999 and the first quarter of 2000. 
However, beginning with the second quarter of 2000, Tower ceased filing its quarterly returns or paying the 
withholding tax. 
10. In an effort to see that the Bank of Utah loan was paid, Petitioner spent $ 15,000 of his own funds to recover the 
largest outstanding account receivable owed to Tower. This receivable was from Nextlink. Nextlink owed 
Tower more than $80,000 but would not pay because Tower had not paid several subcontractors working on the 
project. Because this posed a financial risk for Nextlink, Nextlink was unwilling to pay Tower until the 
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subcontractors' claims were resolved. Using the $15,000, Petitioner personally purchased the claims of the 
subcontractors, which held potential lien rights against Tower. Once Petitioner acquired the claims of the 
subcontractors and released Nextlink, Nextlink paid the amount owed to Tower, although it apparently went 
directly to the Bank of Utah to satisfy that line of credit. The Bank of Utah line of credit was secured by the 
accounts receivable. 
11. In October of 2001, all of Tower's quarterly withholding tax forms for 2000 were filed, but remained unpaid. 
Petitioner was later assessed the personal penalty for the total amount of the company's unpaid withholding tax 
liabilities. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
Utah Law provides for a personal penalty assessment for a company's unpaid withholding tax liabilities. 
It is listed in Utah Code Ann. §59-1-302 and provides in pertinent part: 
(1) The provision of this section apply to the following taxes in this title: . . .(g) 
withholding tax . . . 
(2) Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax 
listed in Subsection (1) who willfully fails to collect the tax, fails to truthfully 
account for and pay over the tax, or attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any 
tax or the payment of the tax, shall be liable for a penalty equal to the total amount 
of the tax evaded, not collected, not accounted for or not paid over. This penalty is 
in addition to other penalties provided by law . . . 
(7)(a) in any hearing before the Commission and in any judicial review of the 
hearing, the commission and the court shall consider any inference and evidence 
that a person has willfully failed to collect, truthfully account for, or pay over any 
tax listed in Subsection (1). 
(b) It is prima facie evidence that a person has willfully failed to collect, truthfully 
account for, or pay over any of the taxes listed in Subsection (1) if the commission 
or a court finds that the person charged with the responsibility of collecting, 
accounting for or paying over the taxes: 
(i) made a voluntary, conscious, and intentional decision to prefer 
other creditors over the state government or utilize the tax money for personal 
purposes; 
(ii) recklessly disregarded obvious or know risks, which 
resulted in the failure to collect, account for, or pay over the tax; or 
(iii) failed to investigate or to correct mismanagement, having 
notice that the tax was not or is not being collected, accounted for, or paid over as 
provided by law. 
- 3 -
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Petitioner was a person responsible for paying over the withholding tax and willfully failed to pay over 
the withholding tax such that the personal penalty was properly assessed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §59-1-302 for the 
three quarters at issue. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The facts in this matter were not significantly in dispute. The Commission considered and weighed all 
of the evidence presented and made its findings based thereon. 
The statute imposing this penalty, Utah Code Ann. §59-1-302, provides for the penalty against: 1) any 
person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax; and that person 2) willfully fails to collect the tax, 
fails to truthfully account for and pay over the tax, or attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax or the payment of 
the tax. 
Thus, first the Commission must consider whether Petitioner is a person responsible for the collecting, 
accounting or paying over the tax. Petitioner was an owner of the business, as well as an officer and director. In addition 
Petitioner was clearly responsible for paying over the tax as he was the only person in the business that had the authority 
to sign the check for the tax payment or for any other expenses. Clearly he was in a position of financial responsibility in 
the business and is a responsible person required to account for and pay over the tax for purposes of the statute. 
As the Commission determines that Petitioner is a responsible party for purposes of Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 59-1 -302 (2) the Commission turns to the second question of whether Petitioner willfully failed to pay over the tax to 
the Tax Commission. The statute at 59-1-302(7) provides three scenarios, of which only one need be met, where it is 
prima facie evidence that a person has willfully failed to collect, truthfully account for, or pay over any of the taxes. The 
scenarios that are relevant in this matter or as follows: (i) a "responsible" party who made a voluntary, conscious, and 
intentional decision to prefer other creditors over the state government or utilize the tax money for personal purposes; or 
(ii) a responsible party who recklessly disregarded obvious or know risks, which resulted in the failure to collect, account 
for, or pay over the tax. Upon review of the facts in this case, Petitioner's actions were prima facie willful pursuant to 
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r> r\ r. r\ <\ 
A p p e a l N o . 0 2 - 1 4 7 2 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-1-302(7). 
The Commission finds that Petitioner recklessly disregarded obvious risks that resulted in the failure to 
pay over the tax. As noted above Petitioner was the only person in the business who was authorized to sign checks on the 
business bank account and clearly he had authority to review all financial documents pertaining to the business. This is 
not a case where one business partner signed checks for payment of taxes, but unbeknownst to him they were held back 
by another partner and not mailed to the taxing agency. In this case checks were not presented to Petitioner for his 
signature and Petitioner did not sign checks for withholding tax payment for the period at issue. Petitioner knew he was 
the only one authorized to sign checks on the account, so he knew that if he was not signing the checks taxes were not 
being paid. Petitioner claims he did not realize that the taxes were not being paid. However, Petitioner's failure to 
realize that withholding taxes were not being paid over a span of three quarters, demonstrated a willful failure to fulfill 
that responsibility considering the circumstances in this matter. Again, as an officer of the company and the sole signer 
on Tower's checks, Petitioner had a duty to investigate the situation as it developed and attempt to correct the problem. 
Rather than fulfill this duty, Petitioner recklessly chose to remain unaware of the problem. Such reckless disregard of an 
obvious risk that withholding taxes were not being paid demonstrated Petitioner's willful failure to pay over Tower's 
withholding taxes. 
The personal penalty assessment against Petitioner was appropriate on the basis of his reckless 
disregard of obvious risks alone. Moreover, Petitioner made a voluntary, conscious, and intentional decision to prefer the 
Bank of Utah over the state of Utah when he was able to obtain payment on Nextlink's obligation to Tower. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds that the personal penalty assessment against 
Petitioner for unpaid withholding taxes for the period of the second through fourth quarters of 2000 is proper. It is so 
ordered. 
DATED this day oitttUt^PCdy, 2003. 
Jan£ Phan \ 
Administrative Law Judge 
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BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION: 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision. 
DATED Ms/J" day of _^>t^^C(^2003. 
o 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commission Chair 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
Notice of Appeal Rights: You have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file a Request for Reconsideration 
with the Tax Commission Appeals Unit pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for Reconsideration must 
allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a Request for Reconsideration with the 
Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty (30) days after the date of this order to pursue 
judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq. 
JKP/02-1472.doc 
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ADDENDUM D 
0 XU NAI IUIN/AL. un^uw _..,, 111 EAST BROADWA» ^UITE 1000 SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
801-983-4550 
64-1278/611 
./ATE 
07-DEC-01 
AMOUNT 
*******$83,211.41 
PAY Eighty-Three Thousand Two Hundred Eleven Dollars And 41 Cents* Tooci • 
TWO SIGNATURES REQUIRED FOR AMOUNTS OVER $500,000 
O THE BANK OF UTAH FOR THE BENEFIT OF TOW 
)RDER 2605 WASHINGTON BLVD 
OF OGDEN, UT 84401 
VOID AFTER 90 DAYS 
it"aooooa&&?&«• I : O & U I 2 7 B B I : 3aq^Ra3I^RH" 
jp Inc 600-733 4277 
KO Communications, Inc. 801-983-4550 
DATE: 07-DEC-01 VENDOR NAME: BANK OF UTAH FOR THE BENEFIT OF TOW No. 2000086626 
INVOICE NO. INVOICE DATE DESCRIPTION DISCOUNT AMOUNT NET AMOUNT 
0001N A 
0001N 
0002N 
14-MAR-01 
13-OCT-01 
27-OCT-01 
FIBER INSTALLATION (LEGAL ISSUE 
FIBER INSTALLATION (LEGAL ISSUE 
FIBER INSTALLATION (LEGAL ISSUE 
0.00 
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AGREEMENT AND FINAL WAIVER, RELEASE AND D I S C H A » [ & 0 ^ ^ ^ 
This AGREEMENT AND FINAL WAIVER, RELEASE AND DISCHARGE is made 
this ]S[ day of AW, 2001, by and between Tower Communications ("Tower"), Eric Stevenson 
("Stevenson"), Brett Cherry ("Cherry") and XO Utah, Inc., formerly known as NEXTLINK 
UTAH("XO"). 
RECITALS 
A. In September 2000, XO and Tower entered into an agreement under which Tower 
was to provide construction related services to XO in connection with the construction of certain 
fiber optic lines, a project known as the "DLJ Direct" Project ("Project"), located in Sandy, Utah. 
B. The Project was finished in approximately October 2000. 
C Eric Stevenson ("Stevenson") and Brett Cherry ("Cherry") are shareholders of 
Tower. 
D. Stevenson has acquired by assignment from the subcontractors on the Project 
certain rights held by the subcontractors in connection with the Project ("Assigned Rights"). 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises and the mutual covenants and 
agreements set forth herein, Tower, Stevenson, Cherry and XO, intending to be legally bound, 
agree as follows: 
1. XO agrees to pay Tower $83,211.41 within 10 (ten) days of the execution of this 
Agreement. Such amount shall be paid by check made out Bank of Utah for the benefit of Tower 
Communications. 
2. Contemporaneous upon execution of this Agreement, Tower agrees to provide XO 
with a release in a form satisfactory to XO from the Bank of Utah approving payment by XO to 
Tower hereunder and releasing any claims the Bank of Utah might have against XO with respect 
to the Project and payments related to the Project. XO's duty to pay Tower pursuant to paragraph 
1 is contingent upon Tower's providing such release. 
3. Tower, for itself, its officers, agents, successors and assigns and anyone claiming 
through or under it, hereby waives, releases and forever discharges XO and all present and future 
owners of the Project and their respective parent companies, affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, 
assigns, agents, employees, lenders and sureties (hereinafter "Releasees") of and from all causes of 
action, suits, debts, accounts, bonds, contracts, promises, damages, liens, encumbrances, 
judgments, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or equity, known or unknown, accrued or 
unaccrued, which Tower ever had, now has or might hereafter have against Releasees jointly or 
separately, in any way connected with, related to or arising out of the aforesaid relationship and 
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contract and/or the performing and/or fiirnishing of any work, labor, services, materials and/or 
equipment for the Project. 
4. Stevenson and Cherry, for themselves, their successors and assigns and anyone 
claiming through or under them, hereby waive, release and forever discharge XO and all present 
and future owners of the Project and their respective parent companies, affiliates, subsidiaries, 
successors, assigns, agents, employees, lenders and sureties (hereinafter "Releasees") of and from 
all causes of action, suits, debts, accounts, bonds, contracts, promises, damages, liens, 
encumbrances, judgments, claims and demands whatsoever, in law or equity, known or unknown, 
accrued or unaccrued, including the Assigned Rights, which Stevenson and Cherry ever had, now 
have or might hereafter have against Releasees jointly or separately, in any way connected with, 
related to or arising out of the aforesaid relationship and contract and/or the performing and/or 
fiirnishing of any work, labor, services, materials and/or equipment for the Project. 
5. Tower, Stevenson and Cherry hereby certify and warrant that all work, labor, 
services, materials, wages and/or equipment engaged, used and/or contracted for by them in 
connection with the Project have been paid in full and that Tower, Stevenson and Cherry will hold 
the aforesaid Releasees harmless against all Mechanics and/or Materialmen's liens, claims, 
demands, damages, costs or other liens or encumbrances, including claims pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 38-1-5, et seq. and 14-2-1, et seq., in any way connected with, related to or arising out of 
any claim for compensation by any other party for work, labor, services, materials, and/or 
equipment incorporated into, performed or furnished for the aforesaid Project and any premises 
connected thereto by Tower, Stevenson and Cherry, or any of their subcontractors, materialmen or 
suppliers. 
6. Should any part, term or provision of this Agreement be decided or declared by the 
Courts to be, or otherwise found to be illegal or in conflict with any laws of the State of Utah, or 
the United States, or otherwise be rendered unenforceable, or ineffectual, the validity of the 
remaining parts, terms, portions or provisions shall be deemed severable and shall not be affected 
thereby, providing such remaining parts, terms, portions or provisions can. be construed in 
substance to constitute the agreement the Parties intended to enter into in the first instance. 
7. Each party represents and warrants that no other person or entity has, or has had, 
an interest in the claims, demands, obligations or causes of action referred to in this Agreement, 
except as otherwise set forth herein; that each party has the sole right and exclusive authority to 
execute this Agreement and receive the sums specified in it; and that neither party has sold, 
assigned, transferred, conveyed or otherwise disposed of any of the claims, demands, obligations 
or causes of action referred to in this Agreement. 
8. This Agreement contains the entire agreement of the parties relating to the subject 
matter hereof, and supersedes all prior agreements and understanding with respect to such subject 
matter. The parties have made no agreements, representations, or warranties relating to the 
subject matter of this Agreement which are not set forth herein. 
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9. This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of 
Utah, notwithstanding the operation of any conflict or choice of law statutes or decisional law to 
the contrary. 
10. In the event legal action is necessary to enforce the terms of this Agreement, the 
prevailing party in such action shall be entitled to recover, ii* addition to any other remedy, its 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in prosecuting such action . 
This FINAL WAIVER, RELEASE AND DISCHARGE has been executed this _i£3ay of 
AWiU*/',2001. 
Tower Construction, Inc. 
Brett Cherry 
#!05Wvl 
XO Utah, Inc. 
By: ifufifl/ft 
Its: &/£* IXJ^L /h$//>?yt-
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ADDENDUM E 
STATUTORY COMPARISON TABLE 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(2) 
(2) Any person required to 
collect, truthfully account for, 
and pay over any tax listed in 
Subsection (1) who willfully 
fails to collect the tax, fails 
to truthfully account for and pay 
over the tax, or attempts in any 
manner to evade or defeat any tax 
or the payment of the tax, shall 
be liable for a penalty equal to 
the total amount of the tax 
evaded, not collected, not 
accounted for, or not paid over. 
This penalty is in addition to 
other penalties provided by law. 
26 U.S.C § 6672(A) 
(a) General Rule - Any person 
required to collect, truthfully 
account for, and pay over any tax 
imposed by this title who 
willfully fails to collect such 
tax, or truthfully account for 
and pay over such tax, or 
willfully attempts in any manner 
to evade or defeat any such tax 
or the payment thereof, shall, in 
addition to other penalties 
provided by law, be liable to a 
penalty equal to the total amount 
of the tax evaded, or not 
collected, or not accounted for 
and paid over. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-302(7) (b) 
(b) It is prima facie evidence 
that a person has willfully 
failed to collect, truthfully 
account for, or pay over any of 
the taxes listed in Subsection 
(1) if the commission or a court 
finds that the person charged 
with the responsibility of 
collecting, accounting for, or 
paying over the taxes: 
(i) made a voluntary, conscious, 
and intentional decision to 
prefer other creditors over the 
state government or utilize the 
tax money for personal purposes; 
(ii)recklessly disregarded 
obvious or known risks, which 
resulted in the failure to 
collect, account for, or pay over 
the tax; or 
(iii) failed to investigate or to 
correct mismanagement, having 
notice that the tax was not or is 
not being colleted, accounted 
for, or paid over as provided by 
law. 
No Comparable 
Federal Statute 
